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DATA AND PERSPECTIVES 
Anthropogenic Factors 
in Land-Use Change in 
China 
GERHARD K. HEILIG 
THERE ARE FEW places in the world where people have changed the land so 
intensely and for such a long time as in China (Perkins 1969). Much of the 
country's inhabited land had been transformed by human intervention sev-
eral hundred years ago. The Loess Plateau of northern China, for instance, 
was completely deforested in preindustrial times (Fang and Xie 1994). Dur-
ing the early Han Dynasty, in the fourth and third centuries BC, the Chi-
nese started systematic land reclamation and irrigation schemes, convert-
ing large areas of natural land into rice paddies. The process, which was 
scientifically planned and coordinated by subsequent dynastic bureaucra-
cies, reached a first climax in the eleventh and twelfth centuries (Braudel 
1990: 159). In the second half of the eighteenth and first half of the nine-
teenth century, another period of massive land modification followed . 
Some recent land-cover and land-use data 
Analyzing land-use data for China is not an easy task. Almost every source 
has different estimates, even for the most basic statistics. Sometimes the 
differences are minor or can be explained, sometimes they are beyond com-
prehension. The data presented below are from various Chinese sources 
and reflect this situation. I first describe the figures and highlight some of 
the discrepancies; I then try to explain and evaluate. 
Table 1 presents basic statistics as they were published in a recent 
book on land use in China by Wu and Guo ( 1994). For comparison the 
table also includes land-use estimates by Sun et al. ( 1994) as well as "offi-
cial" figures from the 1994 Statistical Yearbook of China. 
P O PULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW 23(1) : 139-168 (MARCH 1997) 139 
140 LAND-USE CHANGE IN CHINA 
TABLE l Land use and land cover in China according to three sources 
Statistical 
Sun et al. Yearbook of 
Wu and Guo 1994: 91 1994:165 Otina 1994: 5 
Area Percent of Percent of Area Area 
(in total land cultivated (in million (in million 
million ha) area land ha) ha) 
Total land area 960.0 100.0 960.0 
Cropland 136.4 14.2 100.0 133.3 95.1 1 
2 Horticulture 7.4 0.8 
3 Forests/woodland 195.4 20.4 167.2a 128.6 
4 Grassland/prairie 338.6 35.3 400 400.0 
Agricultural land 
(Total: 1-4) 677.8 70.6 
5 Cities/towns/ 
industry 1.9 0.2 1.4 
6 Rural settlements 23.5 2.4 17.2 
7 Infrastructure 7.1 0.7 5.2 
Nonagricultural land 
26.5b (Total: 5-7) 32.4 3.4 23.8 
8 Inland water bodies/ 
fish ponds 32.5 3.4 17.6( 17.5 
9 Tidal marshes 2.2 0.2 
(Total: S-9) 34.7 3.6 
10 Glacier/snow 6.9 0.7 5.9d 
11 Sandy desert 46.7 4.9 
12 Stone/ 
rock desert (e.g. Gobi) 30.4 3.2 
13 Other (marginal) 
land/mountains 131.2 13.7 185.3e 
(Total: 10-13) 215.l 22.4 318.8g 
NOTE: In Wu and Guo. cropland includes paddy rice. irrigated. and rainfed cropland; in Sun et al., the data refer to cultivated 
land. which includes honiculture. 
• Forest land and shrubs b Residential areas. industry. mining. transponation, etc. <Inland water surface 
d Ice-covered land 'Bare land 1 Known to be underestimated, according to Statistical Yearbook g All other land 
China has a total land area of 960 million hectares (9.6 million km2 ) . 
According to Wu and Guo, some 15 percent is cultivated, about 20 percent 
is forest and woodland, and grassland covers some 35 percent. More than 
22 percent of China's land area is covered by sandy or stony desert (the 
Gobi being the largest), glaciers and permanent snow, and other marginal 
lands. Cities, towns, industrial sites, rural settlements, and infrastructure 
cover some 3.4 percent of the land area. 
These data differ from official statistics (as published in the Statistical 
Yearbook of China) and from estimates by other authors in several impor-
tant respects: 
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-The reported forest/woodland area is larger than the estimates of 
either Sun et al. or the Statistical Yearbook. 
-Inland water bodies and fish ponds are also estimated to be larger 
in size than in the two other sources. 
-The estimate for grassland is 60 million hectares smaller than those 
from Sun et al. and the Statistical Yearbook. 
-Infrastructure, rural and urban settlements, and mining and industrial 
areas are somewhat larger than in Sun et al. 
-The most important difference, however, relates to the estimate of 
cultivated land in Wu and Guo, which is much higher than in the Statistical 
Yearbook, but comparable to the estimate of Sun et al. This is due to a well-
known problem of underreporting in the Statistical Yearbook, which I dis-
cuss later. 
In addition to their own estimates, presented in Table 1, Wu and Guo 
use data from the Statistical Yearbook (including the underreported "'culti-
vated land" statistics) to ascertain changes in land use since 1949, shown 
in Table 2. According to these official data, the largest change was in forest 
land, which was extended by 70 million hectares. Other sources have indi-
cated a decline of China's forest and woodland. A possible explanation for 
the discrepancy is that primary forests in China in fact declined, while the 
total forest area increased due to new plantings. On the other hand, most 
experts agree that China's marginal land ("other land") and grassland de-
clined. Wu and Guo estimated the decline at roughly 59 million hectares 
and 53 million hectares, respectively. 
The next largest change in land use was the expansion of settlement 
areas, mining sites, and transportation infrastructure. According to Wu and 
Guo these areas increased by about 26 million hectares between 1949 and 
1990. By far the largest proportional change of land use in China was the 
TABLE2 Changes in land use in China, 1949 and 1990 (in million 
hectares) 
1949 1990 
Forest and woodland 125.0 195.4 
Settlements, mining, 
and transportation 
infrastructure 6.7 32.8 
Water bodies 22.5 34.1 
Horticulture 1.1 7.4 
Cultivated (crop) land 97.9 95.7 
Grassland 391.9 338.6 
Other (marginal) land 314.9 256.l 
NOTE: Differences between Tables I and 2 are in the original sources. 
SOURCE: Wu and Guo ( 1994) : 77 
Absolute 
change 
70.4 
26.l 
11.5 
6.3 
-2.2 
-53.3 
-58.8 
Percent 
change 
56.3 
387.l 
51.2 
593.8 
-2.2 
-13.6 
-18.7 
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TABLE3 Changes in cultivated land area by province, 1985 and 1995 
(sorted by percentage change) 
Cultivated area Corrected 
(1000 ha) reported cultivated areaa Change Change in Statistical Yearbook Correction (1000 ha) 
factor 1985-95 1985-95 
Province 1985 1995 (Wang et al.) 1985 1995 (1000 ha) (percent) 
Shanghai 340 290 0.14 388 331 -57.1 -14.7 
Guangdong/ 
Hainan 3,035 2,747 0.81 5,493 4,971 -522.2 -9.5 
Zhejiang 1,777 1,618 0.47 2,618 2,383 -234.5 -9.0 
Shaanxi 3,627 3,393 0.54 5,594 5,234 -360.3 -6.4 
Hubei 3,585 3,358 0.24 4,437 4,156 -280.9 -6.3 
Liaoning 3,586 3,390 0.26 4,507 4,260 -246.7 -5.5 
Beijing 421 400 0.26 531 504 -27.1 -5.l 
Shandong 7,038 6,696 0.30 9,137 8,693 --444.0 --4.9 
Tianjin 447 426 0.38 617 588 -28.8 --4.7 
Fujian 1,261 1,204 0 .31 1,646 1,572 -74.4 --4.5 
Jiangsu 4,604 4,448 0.19 5,483 5,298 -185.4 -3.4 
He nan 7,033 6,806 0.27 8,955 8,666 -289.3 -3.2 
Shanxi 3,761 3,645 0.63 6,139 5,950 -189.2 -3.l 
Anhui 4.422 4,291 0.38 6,106 5,925 -180.7 -3.0 
Sichuan 6,367 6,190 0.75 11, 141 10,831 -310.4 -2.8 
Hunan 3,342 3,250 0.49 4,988 4,850 -137.8 -2.8 
Jiangxi 2,369 2,308 0.17 2,761 2,690 -70.6 -2.6 
Guizhou l,873 l.840 1.62 4,906 4,820 -86.4 -1.8 
Hebei 6,603 6.517 0.14 7,511 7.414 -97.5 -1.3 
Jilin 3,999 3,953 0.34 5,362 5,301 -61.4 -1.l 
Xizang (Tibet) 224 222 0.70 381 378 -3.2 -0.8 
Gansu 3.491 3.483 0.68 5,880 5,866 -14.3 -0.2 
Heilongjiang 8,930 8,995 0.27 ll,360 11.443 83. 1 0.7 
Xinjiang 3,083 3,128 0.32 4,063 4,123 59.7 1.5 
Ningxia 795 807 1.31 1,836 l,864 28.2 1.5 
Guangxi 2,563 2,614 0.69 4,344 4.431 86.8 2.0 
Yunnan 2,777 2,871 1.08 5,788 5,983 195.l 3.4 
Qinghai 538 590 0 .64 883 968 85.2 9.6 
Inner 
Mongolia 4,930 5.491 0.39 6,834 7,612 778.2 11.4 
Total 96,821 94,971 0.44 139,689 137,103 -2,586.2 -1.9 
•corrected area= reported area+ (reported area x correction factor). 
SOURCE: Wang et al. 1992; Statistical Yearbook of China 1986 (from: Crook 1993); Statistical Yearbook of China 1996: 355 
expansion of horticulture by almost 600 percent since 1949. This huge in-
crease reflects the small absolute size of the horticulture area in 1949. 
China's State Statistical Bureau has published land-use data by prov-
ince. Unfortunately, they also have the problem of underreporting cultivated 
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land. I used land survey data for 1985 reported by Wang and Crook to cor-
rect both the 1985 and 1995 cultivated land figures from the Statistical Year-
book of China (Wang et al. 1992; Crook 1993). As displayed in Table 3, the 
revised aggregated figures for total cultivated land, based on province-level 
data, are 139.7 and 137.1 million hectares for 1985 and 1995, respectively. 
As can be seen from the correction factor, underreporting was especially 
serious in the provinces of Guizhou (where the cultivated area according 
to Wang et al. was more than twice as large as reported in the Statistical 
Yearbooks), Ningxia, Yunnan, and Guangdong/Heinan. ' 
Based on these revised figures I have calculated both absolute and 
percentage changes of cultivated land by province. I assumed that the re-
gional pattern of underreporting remained constant between 1985 and 
1995. The results indicate a decline of cultivated areas in all but seven prov-
inces; the percent declines are most notable in Shanghai, Guangdong, and 
Zhejiang. Total cultivated land (based on corrected province-level data) de-
clined by about 2.6 million hectares or 1.9 percent. This decline is signifi-
cantly smaller than previous estimates (such as given in Brown 1995). 
Problems with China's land-use statistics 
Obviously, there are inconsistencies in the data reported above. Estimates 
for forest and grassland, for instance, vary considerably. The biggest prob-
lem, however, is the underreporting of cultivated areas. Both the 1993 and 
1994 Statistical Yearbook of China have acknowledged that published figures 
for cultivated areas are "underestimated and must be further verified" ( 1994: 
329) . In 1994 China's State Land Administration (SLA} and the State Sci-
ence and Technology Commission (in collaboration with UNDP and FAQ) 
conducted a major study on land resources, use, and productivity. In a draft 
version of its main report, the SLA estimates that China's cultivated land 
area was 125.23 million hectares in the early 1990s (see UNDP et al. 1994: 
38). This estimate is supported by Alexandratos (1996) from FAQ in a re-
cently published paper. 
The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) is 
conducting a project on land-use change 1 in collaboration with the Chi-
nese Academy of Sciences in which county-level data on agricultural land 
use are analyzed. Aggregation of these county data produces an estimated 
cultivated land area of about 135 million hectares. Recently, China's State 
Land Administration seems to have increased its previous estimate of cul-
tivated land. According to personal communication from Harry van 
Velthuzen (a consultant to the SLA), the Administration is about to publish 
a report in which it will raise China's cropland estimate to over 134 million 
hectares (plus 6.7 million hectares of perennial crops, such as orchards). 
Finally, my own province-based estimates, shown in Table 3, resulted in a 
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total cultivated area of 137.1 million hectares in 1995 (as compared to the 
95 million hectares reported in the Statistical Yearbook). 
In short, we now have three estimates (or, rather, ranges of estimates) 
of China's cultivated land area in 1992-95, not including orchards: 
-the official data from the Statistical Yearbook of 95 million hectares 
(which is commonly considered too low); 
-the widely published "corrected" estimates of about 125 million hect-
ares (Ke 1996; Alexandratos 1996; UNDP et al. 1994); and 
-the most recent revised estimates of about 135 to 137 million hec-
tares (Wu and Guo 1994, and my own estimates in Table 3 ). 
Thus, in the worst case we have a discrepancy of 42 million hectares, 
which is more than twice the total arable land of France (a major Euro-
pean agricultural producer); the more likely estimates of 125 and 137 mil-
lion hectares are still 12 million apart-a figure comparable in size to the 
total arable land of Germany. 
This range of uncertainty is daunting. It has serious consequences for 
assessing China's food prospects. Brown's ( 1995) widely discussed projec-
tion of China's food security, for instance, does not reflect the well-known 
problem of cropland underreporting-leading him to overestimate current 
yields and, consequently, to make extremely pessimistic assumptions about 
the potential for agricultural modernization. Other authors have used crop-
land estimates similar to the revisions noted above, leading them to more 
optimistic projections of China's food production capacity (Alexandratos 
1996; Huang, Rozelle, and Rosegrant 1995; Islam 1995; Johnson 1994; 
Paarlberg 1996; Smil 1995). 
The range in uncertainty will be reduced only if reliable data become 
available, such as from the extensive land survey (comparable to an agri-
cultural census) that was conducted between 1990 and 1992 by the State 
Land Administration. Unfortunately, the results of that survey have not 
yet been published. All recently published estimates cited above are based 
on an earlier agricultural survey conducted by the State Land Administra-
tion in the mid- l 980s. It is unclear whether-and especially how-these 
data were updated to reflect the situation in the mid- l 990s. 
A second problem with land-use statistics in China (as in many other 
parts of the world) is that their attention is heavily biased toward the agri-
cultural sector. While one can now easily find information on cultivated 
areas in China's Statistical Yearbook and other sources (even if of doubtful 
validity), few detailed data are published on land areas used for settlements, 
industrial sites, or infrastructure. This deficit of information on urban and 
industrial land use is critical, since these are the sectors where land-use 
changes, recent and prospective, are likely to be most substantial. 
Finally, some of the most intense land-use changes in China have 
occurred only during the past few years, whereas available statistical time 
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series usually end in 1992 or 1993. Even results of the land survey of China 
from 1990 to 1992, when they become available, will not reflect the most 
recent changes. Areas used for urban and industrial purposes as well as for 
infrastructure significantly expanded after 1990. 
Definitions: Land-use change versus land-cover 
change 
Land-use change-as distinct from land-cover change-is usually an inten-
tional human activity. People use land because they want to extract "re-
sources" (in the widest sense) from the land in order to satisfy their needs 
for food, water, habitation, energy, mobility, or recreation. Humans also 
use land to satisfy aesthetic and spiritual ends or political and military am-
bitions. Land-use activities usually modify the land cover, but sometimes 
people also reserve land for parks where they try to minimize human in-
terference so that a nearly "natural" land cover can remain or redevelop. 
No matter which type of land use we want to study, the analysis focuses on 
human actions and intentions, because they are the main factors that change 
the land cover. And these factors in turn are determined by demographic, 
economic, political, and social processes. To restrict a study of land-use change 
to an inventory or biogeophysical model of land-cover changes would be to 
focus on the results of the process instead of its causes (Heilig 1994). 
There is, of course, land cover in China that is changed by biochemi-
cal and biophysical processes without significant and direct human inter-
vention, such as land that is altered by seismic activities, hydrological pro-
cesses, or climate change. Natural land can also be changed on a large scale 
by forest and grassland fires or epidemic plant diseases. Large parts of China 
are sparsely populated and partly covered by (almost) natural vegetation. 
Direct human intervention in these areas is so minimal that we can prob-
ably analyze and model the vegetation cover in a purely biogeophysical 
cause-and-effect framework. This, however, is not possible with China's 
densely populated and cultivated eastern provinces, where most of the land 
cover is a product of generations of human intervention. This land is not 
just affected but transformed by human action. 
It should also be noted that even where natural land cover exists in 
China, human activities indirectly affect the biogeophysical process through 
which the land cover changes. The possible shift of vegetation belts, the 
migration of plant species, or the land-cover effects of hydrological changes 
can be linked to global climate change, which is at least partly caused by 
human activities. Forest and grassland fires are often manmade, and hy-
drological changes in remote natural areas, such as drying out of rivers, 
can be caused by excessive water consumption in distant agricultural, in-
dustrial, or urban areas. 
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Anthropogenic factors in land-use change 
The following discussion is based on the assumption that future land-use change 
in China's eastern provinces will be largely determined by five factors: 
-the continuing increase of population, 
-rural-to-urban migration and the emergence of urban agglomerates, 
-accelerating economic modernization and industrialization, 
-changes in diets and lifestyles among consumers, and 
-changing economic and political arrangements and institutions. 
Further population increase 
Two characteristics of the Chinese population are significant when analyz-
ing land-use changes: the rapid increase in numbers, especially during the 
past four-and-a-half decades, and the extremely uneven spatial distribution. 
For more than 1,400 years-during the Han, Sui, Tang, Song, Yuan, 
and Ming dynasties-the Chinese empires had a population that fluctu-
ated between 37 and 60 million (Ho 1959). Periods of growth, such as dur-
ing the last half of the eleventh century (Song dynasty), were reversed by 
subsequent population decline (Ge 1993) . The first period of sustained popu-
lation growth in China was recorded between 1749 and 1851, when the 
population more than doubled, from about 177 to some 430 million. The 
increasing food demand made it necessary to expand the cropland by a 
factor of more than four and to improve irrigation. Also, new food crops 
and high-yield rice varieties were introduced (Banister 1987). This growth, 
however, was followed by a century of relative population stagnation due 
to the decline and collapse of the dynastic system, the Japanese invasion, 
and the outbreak of civil war (see Figure 1). 
In the early seventeenth century, China and Europe had broadly simi-
lar population sizes: in 1650 China had a population of about 89 million, 
while Europe's population was about 103 million (see Figure 2). During 
the ensuing 200 years, population growth in China was more rapid than 
that in Europe so that in the middle of the nineteenth century China's 
population size exceeded Europe's by more than 150 million. A century 
later, in 1950, China and Europe had, again, nearly the same population: 
555 million and 549 million. But then a major divergence of trends oc-
curred. While China's population more than doubled since 1950, Europe's 
population increased more slowly, to 727 million. The most dramatic con-
trast, however, is expected to emerge during the next few decades: by 2050 
China will likely have about 1.5 billion inhabitants, while Europe's popu-
lation size will probably decline to well below 700 million. Thus, within 
only one century, China's population will have almost tripled. There are 
even higher, yet not implausible projections. Lutz and colleagues have es-
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FIGURE 1 China's population, AD 1-2050 
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timated that China's population could increase to 1. 9 billion by 2030 (Lutz, 
Prinz, and Langgassner 1994). The International Programs Center of the US 
Bureau of the Census, on the other hand, has estimated that China's popu-
lation is likely to increase to only 1.4 billion by 2050 (Johnson 1995). 
Recent evidence, reported by Feeney and others, indicates that aver-
age Chinese fertility may already have fallen below replacement level dur-
ing the early 1990s (Feeney and Yuan 1994; Feeney and Wang 1993). Thus 
there is little scope for a further fertility decline, which would be the only 
option to halt China's population growth at a level below 1.4 billion. Nei-
ther massive increase of mortality nor large-scale outmigration is plausible. 
There is even some potential for an increase in fertility if the government 
relaxes the one-child policy due to widespread frustration with the mea-
sure. Taking this into account, I consider the most recent UN projection of 
1.52 billion (medium variant, 1996 assessment including Taiwan but ex-
cluding Hong Kong) the most plausible (United Nations 1996). This pro-
jection seems also to be accepted by most Chinese demographers and poli-
ticians (see State Science and Technology Commission 1995). 
The second salient characteristic of China's demographic situation is 
the concentration of its large population into the eastern part of the coun-
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FIGURE 2 Population of China and Europe, 1650, 1749, 1851, 1950, 
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try, especially the coastal zones. Much of China's land is virtually unin-
habited: the Gobi Desert, the steep slopes of the Himalayas, and the vast 
dry grasslands of the north-central region. 
I have used population and area data for 2,550 counties, cities, and 
city districts from China's Ministry of Public Security to analyze the spatial 
distribution of the Chinese population in 1992. First, I calculated the den-
sities of all spatial units and sorted them in decreasing order. Then I cumu-
lated both the land areas and the population. Table 4 presents the results, 
which should be read as follows: 
-Nearly 115 million people (or 10 percent of the population) live in 
an area of only 47,000 km2 • This is just 0.5 percent of the total land mass 
of China. The average population density in these most densely populated 
counties and cities is 2,428 persons per km2 • 
-Fifty percent of the Chinese population live in an area of 778,000 
km2, which represents only about 8.2 percent of the total land. These areas 
have an average population density of 740 persons per km2• 
-Roughly one billion Chinese (or more than 90 percent of the popu-
lation) live in only a little more than 30 percent of the country's land area. 
The population density of this area is 354 persons per km2 • 
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TABLE4 Cumulative distribution of China's land area and 
population density based on data for 2,550 counties, cities, and city 
districts, 1992 
Cumulative Cumulative Cumulative Cumulative Average pop-
land area population percent of percent of lation density 
(km2) 1992 (1000) land population (person/krn2) 
47,297 114,837 0.5 IO 2.428 
170,445 230,247 1.8 20 1,351 
336,812 346,163 3.5 30 1.028 
534.411 460,545 5.6 40 862 
778,021 576,063 8.2 50 740 
1.078.453 691,192 11.3 60 641 
1.486.455 806,126 15.6 70 542 
2,070,090 921,771 21.7 80 445 
2,927,574 1,036,728 30.7 90 354 
9,543,280 1.152,355 100.0 100 121 
NOTE: Due to missing data in some counties and city districts, the cumulative land area reponed here is less 
than the total land area of China. 
SOURCE: People's Republic of China ( 1993) 
In short, most of the population of China is concentrated in less than 
one-third of the country, where the average population density is greater 
than that of Belgium. 
The map in Figure 3 also illustrates the spatial concentration of the 
Chinese population. It shows those Chinese counties, cities, and city dis-
tricts that have a density of more than 150 persons per km2 (gray and black 
areas). The Yangtze Delta, Sichuan, and the counties and cities along the 
eastern coast are the main centers of population. On the other hand, 50 
percent of the Chinese land mass is very sparsely populated, with a den-
sity ranging between 2 persons per km2 in Tibet to 19 persons per km2 in 
Inner Mongolia. Only 3.6 percent of the country's population live in these 
vast areas. 
The highly uneven population distribution of China reflects not only 
the concentration of arable land in the east, but also the transportation 
problems of a continental-scale country. Chinese civilization spread along 
the coastal zones and main rivers, using sea and river transport as a back-
bone of expansion. 
China has not only the largest population of any country, but also 
large subnational populations of very high density. To give a sense of the 
specific combination of population size and density, Table 5 compares Chi-
nese provinces with industrialized countries (or regions) of similar popula-
tion size. The Chinese provinces are typically much more densely popu-
lated than their counterparts elsewhere. 
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FIGURE 3 Population distribution of China, 1992 
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The Chinese province of Anhui, for instance, has the same popula-
tion size as Italy, but more than twice the density, 420 as compared to 189 
person per km2• Spain has a population of 39 million, as does the Chinese 
province of Liaoning; but Spain's population density is 78 persons per km2 
while Liaoning's is 273. Densely settled Germany had a population of about 
80 million in 1990-somewhat more than Guangdong (combined with 
Hainan). These Chinese provinces, however, have a much higher popula-
tion density of 343 persons per km2 as compared to 222 in Germany. All 
countries of Middle Africa combined have about the same population as 
the Chinese province of Jiangsu; the average population density in Middle 
Africa, however, is 11 as compared to 663 persons per km2 in Jiangsu. As a 
last example, both Mexico and the Chinese province of Shandong have a 
population of some 85 million inhabitants; the Chinese province, however, 
has a population density 13 times higher than that of Mexico. The extremely 
high density of China's very large (and still mostly rural) population is a 
critical factor in the country's future development. 
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TABLE 5 Population density of selected Chinese provinces and of selected 
countries or regions with comparable population size 
Chinese provinces Other countries/regions 
Total Total 
population Population population Population 
1993 density 1990 density 
(millions) (persons/km2) (millions) (persons/km2) 
Shandong 86.2 562 Mexico 84.5 43 
Guangdong/Hainan 72.6 343 Germany 79.4 222 
Jiangsu 68.0 663 Middle Africaa 70.5 11 
Hunan 62 .5 306 Iran 58.9 36 
Anhui 58.7 420 Italy 57.0 189 
Hubei 55.9 301 France 56.7 103 
Liaoning 39.8 273 Spain 39.3 78 
Shanxi 29.6 189 Canada 27.8 3 
Inner Mongolia 22 .0 19 Australia 16.9 2 
Tianjin 8.9 787 Sweden 8.6 19 
Ningxia 4 .9 95 Finland 5.0 15 
'Population of Angola. Cameroon. Central Afri can Republic. Chad. Congo. Equatorial Guinea. Gabon. and Zaire combi ned. 
SOURCES: Statistical Yea rbook of China ( 1994); United Nations ( l 995c) . 
Within the next five decades China will have to provide food, energy, 
employment, resources, and housing to roughly an additional 300 million 
people. These new people will need additional space for housing and ur-
ban infrastructure, predominantly in the eastern part of the country and its 
coastal zones, where space can often be taken only from cultivated areas. This 
competition in land-use activities is a core problem of China's-and the 
world's-food security (Heilig 1996) . 
Urbanization 
China has long been the prototype of a rural society. After 1949, the 
government's closed-city policy effectively prevented rapid urbanization, 
and 72 percent of the population is still classified as rural (Statistical Year-
book of China 1994). There are numerous methodological problems in the 
classification and projection of urban populations in China (Goldstein 1990; 
Ma and Cui 1987; Ma and Lin 1993), but the general trend is clear. At-
tracted by the rapidly growing manufacturing and service sectors in towns 
and urban areas, and pushed by rural unemployment, millions of Chinese 
peasants will become urban dwellers in the near future. According to Chi-
nese sources, the number of settlements classified as cities is projected to 
almost double within the next 15 years, from a current 570 to about 1,000. 
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The United Nations Population Division is monitoring the population 
of China's 51 largest cities and urban agglomerations (United Nations l 995a). 
According to their estimates, which are based on Chinese reports, these 
cities had a total population of about 39 million in 1950. Today, their popu-
lation is about 134 million. The UN recently projected that within 20 years 
their combined population would further increase to about 220 million. 
As shown in Figure 4, for instance, Shanghai's population is projected to 
increase to 23 million by 2015, mainly due to rural-to-urban migration; 
Beijing's is expected to reach 19 million and Tianjin's nearly 17 million 
(United Nations l 995a). These projections appear fairly conservative, by 
comparison to historical trends. Between 1950 and 1995 China's largest city 
populations had an average annual growth rate of 2.8 percent. The UN 
projections imply that this growth will slow to an annual rate of 2.0 per-
cent between 1995 and 2015 . 
The State Statistical Bureau has estimated that the urban population 
of China will increase from 28 percent of the total population in 1995 to 
50 percent in 2010. In its most recent assessment the United Nations Popu-
lation Division has estimated an urban population of one billion in 2050-
FIGURE 4 Estimated and projected population of selected Chinese 
cities, 1950-2015 
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two-thirds of the total population projected for that year. In 1950 China's 
urban population was estimated at 61 million (United Nations l 995b). This 
940 million increase in the number of city dwellers is bound to be paralleled 
by a major, although less than proportional, expansion of urban land use. 
The growth of China's cities and urban agglomerations depends, of 
course, on future political and economic conditions. In the 1970s and 1980s, 
the government sought to restrict the number of rural-urban migrants. 
However, there are good economic reasons to believe that even if China's 
government tries to maintain restrictions on spatial mobility, massive ru-
ral-urban migration and city growth cannot be stopped. Beijing and Shang-
hai already have so-called floating populations of between 1 and 2 million 
each. Powerful pull and push factors will generate-if necessary, illegal-
rural-to-urban migration. 
First, there is a huge demand for low-wage rural labor in China's cit-
ies and other urban areas, due to rapid industrialization. Many construc-
tion companies already hire their unskilled workers directly from rural ar-
eas. The booming towns and cities also offer numerous opportunities for 
starting a small private business-from selling self-made household items 
to running a food stall or a street restaurant. Jobs and business opportuni-
ties, however, are not the only attractions of towns and cities. Cities pro-
vide better facilities for education, health care, and entertainment than the 
villages. Only strict control of mobility has so far prevented many of the 
young and energetic from migrating to urban areas. Without these con-
trols a tidal wave of migrants would seek out urban opportunities. 
Second, the large reservoir of the rural unemployed is likely to in-
crease significantly in the next decades. As I noted above, between 1995 
and 2050 China's population is expected to grow by about 300 million. 
Most of this growth will originate in rural areas, but it is unlikely that it 
can be fully absorbed there. Rural unemployment already exists, and the 
mechanization and modernization of agriculture will further reduce labor 
demand. Since 1978, agricultural machinery (tractors) available to farmers 
has increased by a factor of ten; nitrogen fertilizer input grew twelvefold. 
The size of the agricultural labor force will probably stagnate or even de-
cline, as China moves further toward modern agricultural production meth-
ods (Rempel 1996). Population growth and stagnating agricultural labor 
demand will probably generate a large excess rural population. According 
to official Chinese estimates the country may have some 100 million idle 
farmers (Li 1994: 168-169). Other Chinese experts estimate that the sur-
plus of rural labor is on the order of 150 million and could increase to 190 
million by the year 2000 (Jiang, Feldman, and Zhang 199 5). 
The growth of cities and towns usually leads to a conversion of arable 
land into built-up areas, although increasing population density (e.g., "ver-
tical growth" by means of high-rise buildings) somewhat moderates this 
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effect. In contrast to agricultural land-use changes, which are usually re-
versible, transformation of arable land into built-up areas, such as high-
ways or settlements, tends to be permanent or reversible only at very high 
costs. Table 6 reports increases in built-up land in 12 major urban areas of 
China in which such expansion was especially pronounced, either in abso-
lute or in proportional terms, between 1989 and 1995. 
Of course, not all land in urban areas is sealed off by houses or roads. 
Often a significant portion of urban land looks "natural," such as parks, 
gardens, or vegetation belts between highway lanes. It is not the appear-
ance of land, however, but the purpose of its use, that determines how it is 
classified. The purpose of agricultural land is the production of food and 
other agricultural products; it serves the agricultural population as a source 
of food and income. Urban land, on the other hand, no matter how "green" 
it appears, provides space for housing, consumption, spatial mobility, rec-
reation, education, and entertainment to people who earn their income in 
nonagricultural activities. 
Urbanization not only causes an expansion of built-up areas but also 
has far-reaching indirect effects on land-use change. City dwellers need a 
much broader supply and service infrastructure than rural populations, from 
shopping centers to water reservoirs. They usually cannot build their houses 
with local products, such as clay or wood; instead, steel mills and cement 
TABLE 6 Increase of built-up land in 12 urban areas of 
China between 1989 and 1995 (sorted by population size in 1995) 
Population Urban Increase in 
Population increase built-up built-up area 
(millions) 1989-95 area (km2 ) 1989-95 
City 1989 1995 (millions) (percent) 1989 1995 (km2) (percent) 
Chongqing 3.0 15.2 12.2 413.7 84 184 100 118.8 
Shanghai 7.8 13.0 5.2 67.3 248 390 142 57.l 
Beijing 6 .2 10.7 4.5 73.3 395 477 82 20.6 
Chengdu 2 .8 9.7 6.9 250.l 83 129 46 55.0 
Shijiazhuang 1.2 8.5 7.3 615.7 69 97 28 40.8 
Guangzhou 3.5 6.5 2.9 83.3 182 259 77 42 . l 
Hangzhou 1.3 6.0 4.7 350.3 68 102 34 50.5 
Fuzhou 1.3 5.6 4.4 342.9 49 68 19 38.7 
Dalian 2.4 5.4 3.0 125.8 101 218 117 115.8 
Hefei 1.0 4.1 3.1 320.7 66 86 20 29.9 
Hohhot 0.9 1.8 0.9 104.l 58 78 20 35.5 
Urumqi 1.1 1.4 0.3 29.6 62 83 21 32.9 
NOTE: Population figures are based on city infrastructure statistics and are different from population figures of 
the Ministry for Public Security or those shown in Figure 4 above. 
SOURCE: Statistical Yearbook of China I 990 and 1996: 332. 335, 632. 
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factories are necessary for urban construction. They cannot collect firewood 
for cooking and heating, but depend on the production and distribution of 
commercial energy. Cities also need special areas for sewage treatment and 
waste disposal. In a village this is often done by reserving a certain spot be-
hind the house. The process of urbanization usually triggers the growth of 
specific commercial sectors, supply infrastructures, and city-specific land-use 
forms, such as parks, recreation areas, and sport stadiums. 
Economic modernization and industrialization 
The economic reforms of 1978 were probably more important to China's 
future land-use patterns than any other single event in recent history 
(Yabuki 1995). A decade after the dislocations of the Cultural Revolution 
and two years after Mao Zedong's death, China's leaders decided to gradu-
ally abandon the system of collective land ownership and centralized com-
mand economy. Family farming was reintroduced along with a limited sys-
tem of agricultural markets. The impact was spectacular. Agricultural output 
increased rapidly and at rates well exceeding the rate of population growth. 
Within ten years, China's peasants almost doubled the production of rice. 
But the growth was not only in volume; decentralized planning favored 
diversification, and farmers began to concentrate on products in which they 
had a comparative advantage. Before the liberalization, central planners 
had often forced them to grow rice where it would have been more eco-
nomical to grow wheat, or to keep pigs where they could have been rais-
ing cattle. The new flexibility broadened the range of agricultural produc-
tion to non-rice crops, aquacultures, and various livestock. Consumption 
of meat, a scarce food item in the 1950s and 1960s, began to soar. Avail-
able statistics indicate the great expansion and increasing diversity of agri-
cultural production after 1978 (see Figure 5). 
The growth of agricultural production from 1978 to the mid-l 980s 
was far more rapid than most observers anticipated. It was driven, as Barnett 
( 1986: 7-8) noted, by the "deep-rooted entrepreneurial impulses among 
China's peasants that long have been suppressed." The spurt in agricul-
tural productivity eliminated the greatest risk for the Chinese peasant: fam-
ine. Less than a generation after some 30 million people had died in the 
famine of the Great Leap Forward (Ashton et al. 1984), farmers could not 
only feed their families, but also increase their consumption of meat, fish, 
sugar, and fruits. For the first time, farmers could also generate enough 
money to buy such consumer goods as bicycles, televisions, and watches. 
National income statistics show the trigger effect of the 1978 reforms. 
Chinese business acumen showed up with even greater clarity as the 
first wave of economic modernization in China began to subside in the 
mid- l 980s. The economic reforms not only returned farmland to the peas-
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FIGURE 5 Indexes of per capita output (in kg) of major agricultural products, 
1952-93 (1952 = 100) 
1952 54 56 58 60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 
Year 
SOURCE: Statistical Yearbook of Ch ina 1994: 31 
ants, but also fostered the development of small-scale rural industries. These 
village and township enterprises were highly successful (Baum 1994) . Their 
number increased more than twelvefold, from 1.5 million in 1978 to 19 
million in 1991, at which time they generated about 30 percent of China's 
gross national product-exceeding the share of agricultural output (Kristof 
and WuDunn 1994). In the early 1990s further Dengist reforms stimulated 
peasants' engagement in countryside enterprises. Between 1991 and 1993, 
the number of such enterprises further increased from 19 million to al-
most 25 million (Statistical Yearbook of China 1994: 361). 
With these reforms, the Chinese leadership successfully addressed three 
fundamental problems of any developing economy: it reduced the power 
of the central bureaucracy, slowed the migration of farmers to the cities, 
and provided an opportunity for rural people to learn about modern tech-
nology and business. Unlike state-run heavy industries, the town and vil-
lage enterprises, which typically employ only a few dozen to a few hun-
dred people, are owned by local governments, and their management is 
largely independent of national plans and regulations. Decentralized plan-
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ning facilitated innovation. While most enterprises started with the pro-
duction of crude consumer goods for local demand, some of them soon 
switched to the production of more-profitable goods for urban and inter-
national consumers. Some rural enterprises are heavy polluters of agricul-
tural land and most are still far from Western standards of efficiency, but 
they have helped to absorb excess agricultural labor-corresponding to an 
estimated total population of 100 million to 200 million. The greatest po-
tential benefit of rural enterprises, however, is that they generate a broad 
cadre of managers and skilled laborers who are familiar with market mecha-
nisms, understand technology, and have learned the discipline of manu-
facturing processes. 
This broad base of trained human resources is a prerequisite for suc-
cess in the third phase of economic modernization in China that started in 
the early 1990s and is in full swing today. It is characterized by rapid growth 
of the industrial, transportation, and construction sectors. 
The geographical center of China's economic modernization is the 
heavily populated coastal provinces of Guangdong, Jiangsu, Shandong, Lia-
oning, and Shanghai, where in 1993 the gross domestic product was nearly 
90 times higher than in the western part of the country. Guangdong's GDP 
alone was equivalent to the combined GDP of Xinjiang, Tibet, Qinghai, 
Gansu, Yunnan, Inner Mongolia, and Heilongjiang provinces. In other 
words, on 2.2 percent of China's total land area, the province of Guangdong 
generates the same GDP as the seven other provinces just listed, which 
cover almost 63 percent of the country's land area (see also Tuan 1993). 
Economic observers suggest that the urban areas of the Yangtze Delta, which 
represent the centers of China's economic growth, will fuse into an ex-
tended metropolitan area as did the urban centers along America's east coast, 
from Boston through New York to Washington, D.C. (The Economist 1995). 
While Western scholars speculate about a China whose transporta-
tion problems would be solved (for the sake of decreasing global carbon 
dioxide emissions) by a mixture of reliance on bicycles and access to public 
transportation, China's planners have decided that road transport will be a 
backbone of the country's economy (The Economist 1996). And private car 
ownership is envisaged as the growth engine for this plan (Tyler 1994). In 
late 1994, He Guangyuan, China's minister of industry, announced that 
"to increase car sales the state will introduce incentives to car buyers to 
boost market demand" (International Herald Tribune 1994). In the summer 
of 1995, the Chinese government declared that the automotive sector will 
be the "pillar industry" of the economy. In the meantime, China's auto-
mobile industry, which was fragmented into some 125 state-run car manu-
facturers, is in the process of consolidation. Three or four large producers 
are expected to emerge from joint ventures with foreign companies, dou-
bling annual car production from today's 1.5 million to 3 million in the 
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year 2000. By 2010, annual production could reach more than 4 million 
cars (International Herald Tribune 1995). 
How will this economic transition affect the use of land in China? A 
number of major trends can be anticipated. Expanding facilities for energy 
generation (water reservoirs), transportation infrastructure, and commer-
cial buildings will consume valuable cropland in China. To meet economic 
growth, Chinese researchers have estimated, energy production will have 
to be increased by at least three to five times. Most of this energy will come 
from coal, but there are also plans to expand hydropower. The construc-
tion of reservoirs will directly affect land use in river valleys. Work on the 
$30 billion "Three Gorges" project, a massive scheme to dam the Yangtse 
River, was started only recently. This dam will drown some 46,000 hect-
ares of fertile land (Topping 199 5). 
Further economic growth in China will require a massive expansion 
of the private transportation sector. Between 1978 and 1995, total freight 
traffic in China almost quintupled, from 983 to 3,573 billion t km (see Table 
7). The modernization and commercialization of agriculture and the fur-
ther expansion of industry need a much larger transportation capacity than 
do traditional farming and small-scale industries. Farmers have to supply 
distant markets within (and possibly also outside) the country. They need 
inputs (fertilizer, pesticides) that are produced in industrial areas and must 
be transported to rural areas. Export-oriented industrial production, which 
is rapidly expanding in China, generates a much higher transportation vol-
ume than traditional small-scale industries that supplied local markets. The 
growth of transportation infrastructure is already well underway. High-
ways, such as those between Guangzhou and Shenzhen, between Beijing 
and Shijiazhuang, and between Beijing and Tianjin, will cut through former 
rice paddies to connect the industrial and urban centers in China's eastern 
provinces. Between 1980 and 1993 the area of paved roads in urban areas 
more than quintupled, from 253 km2 to 1,358 km2, and the per capita area 
of urban roads increased from 2.8 to 7.3 m 2 (Statistical Yearbook of China 
1996). And all large cities in China will expand their perimeter due to an 
uncurbed construction boom. 
The automobile industry (which was also the growth engine of 
Germany's "economic miracle" in the 1950s and 1960s) is expected not 
only to boost China's economy, but also to transform its economic struc-
ture. Private trucks will stimulate economic flexibility and expand mar-
kets. Commercial road transport in China will accelerate the transition from 
an agricultural to an industrial and service economy. Small-scale produc-
ers and service enterprises will be able to reach distant markets and con-
sumers. The automobile will also change everyday life in China. With a 
"people's car" (the Chinese actually use the same term as the popular German 
automobile, "Volkswagen") individual mobility2 will greatly increase. 
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TABLE 7 Selected consumption and lifestyle-related statistics for 
China, 1985 and 1995, and percent increase between the two years 
Ownership of major durable consumer 
goods (per 100 households)a 
Urban households 
Bicycles 
Washing machines 
Refrigerators 
Color television sets 
Recorders 
Cameras 
Rural households 
Bicycles 
Washing machines 
Refrigerators 
Color television sets 
Recorders 
Cameras 
Mobility /transportation 
Total passenger trafficb (billion person km) 
Civil aviation 
Highways 
Railways 
Total freight traffic volume< (billion t km) 
Civil aviation 
Highways 
Railways 
Total number of touristsd (millions) 
Area of paved roads in urban areas (km2 ) 
Per capita area of paved roads in 
urban areas (m2 ) 
Income, standard of living 
Urban households 
Annual per capita income (yuan)• 
Per capita floor space (m2) 
Rural households 
Annual per capita income of farmers (yuan)1 
Per capita floor space (m2 ) 
1985 
152.3 
48.3 
6.6 
17.2 
22.3 
8.5 
80.6 
1.9 
0.1 
0.8 
4.3 
443 .7 
11.7 
172.5 
241.6 
1,812.6 
0.4 
169.3 
812 .6 
17.8 
359 
3.1 
685 
5.2 
398 
14.7 
1995 
194.3 
89.0 
66.2 
89.8 
45.3 
30.6 
147.0 
16.9 
5.2 
16.9 
28.3 
1.4 
900.2 
68.1 
460.3 
354.6 
3,573.0 
2.2 
469.5 
1.287.0 
46.4 
1,358 
7.3 
3,893 
8.1 
1,578 
21.0 
159 
Increase 
1985-95 
(percent) 
28 
84 
906 
422 
103 
259 
82 
789 
8,483 
2,015 
552 
103 
482 
167 
47 
97 
458 
177 
58 
160 
279 
135 
468 
56 
297 
43 
'Based on sample surveys of urban and rural households. b Total number of passengers x transportation 
distance (km) . <total freight volume (int) x transportation distance (km) . dTotal number of tourists in 1995 
include: 5.9 million foreign tourists and 40.5 million Chinese from Hong Kong. Macao. Taiwan, or overseas. 
•Disposable income after tax. 1 Total income after deduction of investments (agricultural inputs, construc-
tion) ; this is an indicator of peasants' actual income level. 
SOURCES: Srarisrical Yearbook of China 1994: 22. 24. 312; Starisrical Yearbook of China 1996: 279, 283, 309, 334, 
500, 579 
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Changes in diets and lifestyles 
Changing diets can have a large impact on agriculture. It makes a major 
difference in terms of land use and energy efficiency whether the bulk of 
one's daily calories are consumed as a T-bone steak or bowls of rice. In 
speculating about trends in food consumption, much depends on the fu-
ture level of incomes and the pattern of prices for food and nonfood items. 
But cultural factors also have to be taken into account. Food consumption 
is not just the supply of carbohydrates, protein, fat, vitamins, and fiber. It is 
also a way of life (Heilig 1993 ). Chinese cuisine may resist Western dietary 
trends. 
We know that urban populations consume different kinds of food than 
do peasants. An increase in the proportion of the population that is urban 
will affect China's overall food composition. Time-series data indicate that 
a significant change in diets has already occurred in China during the last 
few decades (see Figure 6). Cross-country comparisons are another way to 
examine future trends of food consumption in China. Other Asian coun-
tries, such as Japan and South Korea, have undergone changes in dietary 
patterns that help to predict the direction of the Chinese transition (see 
Table 8). And finally, cultural influences on Chinese food preferences, 
mainly coming from the West, may be more rapid and profound than ex-
pected. Several trends seem relevant in this regard. 
China's meat consumption significantly increased during the past 30 
years. Per capita output of animals slaughtered, for instance, grew from 
about 4 kg per year in 1961 to almost 30 kg per year in 1992. The increase 
of meat consumption in China was mainly due to increased consumption 
of pork. Mutton, veal, and beef are not very popular in China. 
It is likely that the consumption of animal-based foods (meat, dairy 
products, eggs) will further increase in China. Other Asian countries, such 
as Japan, already consume relatively high levels of animal-based foods (see 
Table 8). If Hong Kong's dietary patterns are indicative of China's future 
food preferences, a massive increase in the consumption of animal-based 
food products (especially milk and meat) can be anticipated. The #West-
ern" dietary pattern is probably most clearly represented by the United 
States. The US diet could be considered to represent an upper limit for the 
consumption of meat and dairy products. 
What would be the land-use consequences of an accelerated trend 
toward an animal-based diet in China? A further increase of pork con-
sumption would probably boost the demand for feed crops, such as corn 
and soybeans; the area devoted to soybean cultivation increased signifi-
cantly during the last few years in China. While soybeans originated in 
China and were cultivated there nearly 5,000 years ago (Cheng 1993: 179), 
the crop was not extensively grown before the late 1980s. The 1994 Statis-
tical Yearbook reports the area of cultivation for soybeans beginning with 
FIGURE 6 Food consumption patterns in China: Average daily per 
capita calorie consumption and percent of that consumption 
accounted for by various food products, 1961-94 
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TABLES Patterns of food consumption in China, Hong Kong, Korea, 
Japan, United States, and the European Union: Average calorie 
consumption per capita per day, 1992-94 (three-year average) 
Calories, by source, per capita/day (kcal) 
Hong 
China Kong Korea Japan USA EU(l2) 
Total 2,762 3,220 3,229 2,890 3,609 3,458 
Vegetable products 2,362 2,284 2,765 2,297 2,502 2,337 
Animal products 401 936 464 593 1,107 LI22 
Cereals, excluding beer 1,782 1,024 1,558 1,186 833 820 
Meat 286 521 238 153 442 481 
Starchy roots 147 61 33 74 102 149 
Vegetable oils 130 552 251 267 455 468 
Sweeteners 74 301 294 292 628 365 
Vegetables 61 53 148 75 66 80 
Alcoholic beverages 49 54 258 160 37 205 
Eggs 39 54 36 79 51 50 
Animal fats 31 119 46 49 202 221 
Fruits 29 93 71 54 137 135 
Pulses 27 27 36 21 35 33 
Fish, seafood 22 104 90 185 30 39 
Milk 13 108 28 111 366 311 
Stimulants 20 3 19 14 21 
Other 72 129 138 162 213 81 
Calories by source (percent) 
Hong 
China Kong Korea Japan USA EU(l2) 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Vegetable products 85.5 70.9 85.6 79.5 69.3 67.6 
Animal products 14.5 29.1 14.4 20.5 30.7 32.4 
Cereals, excluding beer 64.5 31.8 48.3 41.l 23.l 23.7 
Meat 10.4 16.2 7.4 5.3 12.2 13.9 
Starchy roots 5.3 1.9 1.0 2.6 2.8 4.3 
Vegetable oils 4.7 17.l 7.8 9.2 12.6 13.5 
Sweeteners 2.7 9.4 9.1 10.l 17.4 10.5 
Vegetables 2.2 1.6 4.6 2.6 1.8 2.3 
Alcoholic beverages 1.8 1.7 8.0 5.5 1.0 5.9 
Eggs 1.4 1.7 1.1 2.7 1.4 1.4 
Animal fats 1.1 3.7 1.4 1.7 5.6 6.4 
Fruits 1.0 2.9 2.2 1.9 3.8 3.9 
Pulses 1.0 0.8 1.1 0.7 1.0 1.0 
Fish, seafood 0.8 3.2 2.8 6.4 0.8 1.1 
Milk 0.5 3.4 0.9 3.9 10.l 9.0 
Stimulants 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.7 0.4 0.6 
Other 2.6 4.0 4.3 5.6 5.9 2.4 
NOTE: EU(l2) =the European Union's pre-1995 12 member countries: Belgium. Denmark. France, Germany. 
Greece, Ireland, Italy. Luxembourg, Netherlands. Ponugal. Spain. and the United Kingdom. 
SOURCE: FAO 1996. 
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1992, when the figure was 8 million ha. By 1993 the total sown area of 
soybeans had increased to over 12 million ha. This is equivalent to the 
combined areas for the production of vegetables, tobacco, sugar, and tea. 
In Heilongjiang, one-third of all cropland is used for the cultivation of soy-
beans; in provinces with much arable land, such as Henan and Sichuan, soy-
bean cultivation has increased to between 4 percent and 6 percent of total 
cropland. A further trend toward meat-rich diets in China would trigger a 
corresponding decline in areas devoted to the cultivation of roots and tubers. 
Parts of China's grasslands might be suitable for ranging additional 
cattle. Although far less popular than pork, beef is not unknown to Chi-
nese cuisine, so it might be reasonable to consider the vast grasslands as 
one of the underutilized resources for food production. The main problem, 
however, is limited availability of water. Large herds of cattle would re-
quire the drilling of wells in dry areas. Even if there is enough water un-
derground, massive ecological problems, like those experienced in the Sahel, 
could follow. Obviously, any expansion of pastoral systems in China has to 
take into account the close relationship between the productivity of live-
stock and existing ecological conditions. Pastoral systems can only increase 
production when they are adapted to the temperature, topography, availabil-
ity of water, and vegetation and topsoil within the specific grassland area. 
In addition to changes in diets, as people become more affluent they 
usually demand larger flats or move to suburban houses with gardens. Much 
economic growth would have to take place before Chinese cities expand 
into space-consuming suburbs. But even a modest increase in the demand 
for improved housing, and the likely splintering of large multi-generational 
Chinese households into nuclear-family households, are likely to boost land 
demand for urban housing. Between 1978 and 1995 the per capita living 
floor space had already increased from 3.6 to 8.1 m 2 in urban areas and 
from 8.1to21.0 m 2 in rural areas (Table 7). 
China has recently reduced the number of working days per week 
from six to five. This immediately sparked a small-scale vacation boom. 
Recreational land use is still very small in China, but with increased wealth 
this will change. Official statistics already indicate a more than threefold 
increase in the per capita size of "public green areas" since 1980. Total pas-
senger traffic in China has increased from 174 billion person km in 197 8 to 
900 billion person km in 1995 (Table 7). 
In 1995, almost 6 million foreigners visited China, an increase of some 
13 percent as compared to 1994 (International Herald Tribune 1996). Alto-
gether China had 48.4 million tourist visits in 1995, the majority by expa-
triate Chinese from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macao who visited relatives 
and friends (Table 7). This influx of visitors not only generates earnings 
(209.8 billion yuan in 1995, or 3.6 percent of China's GDP) but will inevi-
tably change attitudes and lifestyles. In China's largest cities, one can ob-
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serve Western-style weddings, beauty contests, gambling halls, cellular 
phones, fast-food restaurants, and luxury limousines (Zha 1995). 
Future political and economic conditions 
Future land use in China depends heavily on how the country's leaders 
pursue reform. China may follow a course of further economic liberaliza-
tion and gradual progress toward democracy; civil conflict might be sparked 
by regional diversity and popular discontent with political and civil repres-
sion; or a post-Deng "strong man" or power elite might curb economic and 
political reforms and recentralize authority (Segal 1994; Lieberthal l 995a, 
l 995b; Lam 1995). 
Under the most optimistic scenario, China would realize a unique 
achievement among the communist states of the twentieth century: a 
smooth transition from command to market economy, a gradual liberal-
ization of society, and a peaceful transition to democracy (Overholt 1993 ). 
The China of the twenty-first century would be more open to the outside 
world, wealthier, and more regionally diverse. There would be more indi-
vidual freedom, greater political participation and economic flexibility, but 
probably also more corruption and greater disparities in income and wealth 
(Lieberthal l 995a; l 995b; Miles 1995: 147ff). 
Land use under this political scenario would be increasingly domi-
nated by market mechanisms. Private owners and local government-not 
a remote central bureaucracy-would make the key decisions about land 
use. The price of land would greatly determine the purpose for which it is 
to be used (see World Bank 1993). Private farmland in close proximity to 
large cities and towns would be quickly converted into residential suburbs 
and commercial sites. 
If China's agriculture moves toward a market system, consumer de-
mand will primarily determine how the arable land is used. This is a clear 
lesson from Europe and Northern America. Thus, changes in income, food 
consumption, and other socioeconomic conditions would be major driving 
forces of land use. 
We can assume that in the "economic growth" scenario just outlined, 
China's agricultural land-use patterns would be fragmented, highly vari-
able, and regionally diverse, due to individual decisionmaking of landowners 
and changing consumer demand (Wang and Murie 1996). Much land would 
be transformed for urban use or as industrial sites. The rapidly growing 
industrial economy would require a significant expansion of transporta-
tion infrastructure, which would not only cut through cultivated areas, 
but also open up previously remote areas to settlement and resource ex-
ploitation. Much more land than today would be needed as parks and rec-
reation areas for the expanding urban population. 
GERHARD K. HEILIG 165 
While most professional China observers predict continuous economic 
and political development for the country, adverse alternative scenarios 
cannot be overlooked (Krugman 1994; Hornik 1995). As Arthur Waldron 
( 1995) has pointed out, "substantial-and not evolutionary or gradual-
changes are not only possible but likely." The greatest threat to China's 
economic and political stability comes from within the system, namely the 
contradiction between economic liberalization and ongoing political con-
trol. China's small but growing middle class of successful managers, entre-
preneurs, and professionals may resist the top-down control of the com-
munist bureaucracy. Students and intellectuals may not be kept quiet 
forever. To compete in international markets, the economy needs compe-
tent managers who know the world. But those who are sent abroad have 
seen individual and political freedom and may demand some of the same 
back home. Equally explosive might be the rapidly growing regional diver-
sity that is also a result of China's economic success. The country's vast 
size has always been a threat to its unity, but the threat will be even greater 
as the provinces drift further apart in their economic performance. 
Another possibility for China, therefore, is that the leaders might 
recentralize the power structure. The land-use consequences of a return to 
central authority and communist economy would probably be a slowdown 
of urbanization-partly due to stricter control of mobility, partly due to a 
brake on urban economic growth. With a reestablishment of central plan-
ning, land cultivation would become more homogenous. In the current 
system of family farming, peasants have some incentives to increase pro-
ductivity: they can use part of their production to generate private profits, 
by selling it either on urban markets or to state agencies. Hence, farmers 
will try to optimize land cultivation, a goal that is neither necessary nor 
possible with centralized political control, since land use is determined by 
a general economic plan. 
Conclusion 
I have identified five anthropogenic factors as major driving forces of land-
use change in China: population growth, urbanization, industrialization, 
changes in lifestyles and consumption, and shifts in political and economic 
arrangements and institutions. A first set of empirical data has been col-
lected and briefly described here to delineate the demographic and socio-
economic changes that are likely to affect future land use. I also presented 
further evidence that China's cultivated land area is more seriously 
underreported than previously recognized. 
In the next half-century the population of China is likely to grow by 
some 300 million inhabitants. Rural-to-urban migration and the growth of 
cities and industrial infrastructure will be the dominant factors in land-use 
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change, particularly in the densely settled eastern provinces. Lifestyle ad-
justments reflecting growing incomes and changing cultural influences will 
result in greater consumption of animal-based foods, demand for larger 
apartments or suburban houses, and a massive expansion in private means 
of transportation. Private farmland close to booming cities will be rapidly 
converted into residential and commercial sites. Finally, under the most 
optimistic political and economic conditions, China will be not only 
wealthier, but also more open to outside influences, and more regionally 
diverse. For such a development, greater income disparities will be one of 
the prices to pay. 
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